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Abstract
Railway system as part of the general transportation system is a strategic element that supports the economy and the society. Its role 
is continuously rising with rapid industrialization, urbanization, and changes in the society expectations regarding sustainable systems. 
New and emerging technologies call and permit the augmentation of the railway systems’ disaster management. This paper deals with 
the development of an improved response management concept related to railways’ damage, caused by earthquakes. The paper 
synthetizes the latest technologies, engineering, and management methods in one improved response management system. After 
the concept inspiration, the paper describes the applicable novel models and introduces an improved response management being 
developed for railway systems, damaged by earthquakes. The concept is verified in simulation. The novelty includes a new approach 
in the identification of the critical infrastructure, the risk assessment, the prediction of aftershocks and the recursive application of the 
adaptive Markov process to the simulation supporting the response management concept.
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1 Introduction
Railways play a deterministic role in the economy, soci-
ety, and strategic defense duties. Such systems are called 
as large natural-technogenic system [1]. It is a man-made 
(-genic) technical/technological (techno) system based in 
the natural (ground-soil, water-rivers) environment. With 
a wider approach, such systems are ecological-socio-tech-
nogenic systems. 
Railway systems are large, geographically distributed 
net of critical elements, critical infrastructures being com-
posed of major tracks, bridges, tunnels, railway stations 
(as modal transportation centers), technical depos, (single) 
info-communication systems, energy supporting structures, 
monitoring, and warning elements, operation centers.
Railways as a strategic system must return to their oper-
ational level after a disaster as quickly as possible. Oper-
ational level means that railways are capable to transport 
people, goods, while the system's performance (as speed) 
might be limited. Therefore, the operational level depends 
on e.g., the initial infrastructure condition, damages, dam-
ages of the other transportation means. This is a perfor-
mance that must be defined and maintained by the disaster 
response managers. (Track of high-speed rail must be fully 
repaired and tested before restarting the operation.) 
Railway system must be developed, designed, and built 
for maximum loads caused by the earthquakes. Earthquakes 
generate a series of seismic waves that are generally fol-
lowed by a sequence of aftershocks and secondary hazards 
(such as fire, volcanic actions, tsunamis, landslide, lique-
faction) [2–6], change in ground level, and/or flooding and 
dam failure. Such disaster causes maximum loads in the rail-
ways system. Long-term prediction (about time, intensity, 
and location of future events) of earthquakes' occurrence is 
estimable by statistical and probabilistic models, while the 
short-term prediction today is rather problematic [7]. 
In general, aftershocks occur after the main earthquake 
with a relatively large probability [8] which can be predicted 
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by several models [9, 10], However, these models cannot 
provide a general approximation due to the significant uncer-
tainties related to the parameters, and the fact that the loca-
tion of aftershock occurrences cannot be predicted robustly 
by the recent models. Secondary hazards play a significant 
role, causing around 30% of fatalities in earthquake disas-
ters. These secondary effects can be observed easily and 
their evolution at areas with large population can be sim-
ulated and predicted with relatively good accuracy [3, 5].
The overall objective of this paper is to develop 
improved management rules for the technical response to 
earthquake damaged railway systems supported by a sim-
ulation model. This is a unique methodology that utilizes 
the available models, software [2–10], which should be 
applied to solve the problems caused by incomplete and 
randomly changed information in the framework of a set 
of management rules that applies the physics-based solu-
tions, semi empirical, statistical/stochastic models and 
new approaches based on artificial intelligence.  
The paper is composed of the following five major sec-
tions: (i) the concept inspiration, (ii) the description of the 
enhanced methods, rules (as the identification of the critical 
infrastructures, the development of a prediction technique 
related to aftershock appearance), (iii) the introduction of 
the improved response management methodology devel-
oped to earthquakes damaged railway systems, (iv) the 
concept verification with simulations and (v) the discus-
sion of the results. 
The novelty includes new approaches to identify the crit-
ical infrastructure, to perform risk assessment, to predict the 
aftershocks and to apply the adaptive Markov process over 
the simulations that support the response management. 
2 Concept inspiration
An extensive investigation was performed, [11,12] on: 
• the role of railways in the modern economy, society, 
and mobility,
• the historical data of earthquake disaster events and 
their damages caused in the railway systems,
• the legal control system developed for disaster man- 
agement,
• the possible and applicable methods,
• the new available and emerging technologies, solu-
tions, methods, rules, software,
• the possible synthesis of the engineering methods 
and management art (methods).
The most important results of these investigations are 
summarized in the follow-up sections. 
2.1 Statistical data available
Large sets of statistical data are available [13] and numer-
ous articles investigate the earthquakes and the response 
process being occurred.
Railway systems might suffer extensive damage and it 
can be even entirely destroyed by an earthquake. The actual 
damage depends on the local conditions, especially on 
the distance from the epicenters, the relative position of 
the railway system elements, the directional effects of the 
earthquake, and the types as well as the mechanical proper-
ties of the soil. 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the size of the damage zones (maxi-
mum distance from epicenters), which might considerably 
vary (see the track damages). 
The specialists identify bridges as the most critical ele-
ments of the railway systems [16]. They also underline that 
their recovery is a more complex task than the reparation 
of the tracks. Therefore, preliminary actions should focus 
on bridges with attention to (i) the enhancement of the 
rules and regulations to design, construction, and opera-
tion, (ii) the development of passive and active monitoring 
systems including remote condition monitoring, (iii) the 
augmentation of the preparedness level and (iv) the intro-
duction of the active total management system related to 
response and recovery management.
2.2 Disaster management legacy
The required preparedness level is (i) expected by the 
economy and society (stakeholders), (ii) estimated by 
professional experts and (iii) defined by policy and rule 
makers. The preparedness level should make a balance 
between the demands of the economy and society as well 
as the available financial support, between the acceptable 
risk and willingness to pay for hazard reduction. 
Fig. 1 The maximum distance from the epicenter to the railway 
facilities being damaged (based on data from [14, 15])
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The laws, directives, rules, and requirements regulat-
ing disaster management were investigated. The top-level 
emergency management is defined by policy makers [17] 
and by legislation [18, 19]. 
The comparison of the international regulations [20, 21] 
shows that the national regulations usually follow the con-
cept described by the CMDA (The Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Management Agency) [22]. Further analysis of 
the emergency management regulations of US, Japanese, 
European, Hungarian and Kazakhstan's regulatory sys-
tems helped to conclude the followings: 
• there is no principal difference in the compared regu-
latory systems, neither structural, nor in the contents,
• there is a lack of regulation related to the use of the 
railway systems in disaster management.
Each country organizes its central national response 
framework by creating laws [11, 23, 24]. U.S. may have the 
largest and most regulated framework [25]. In Europe, the 
Civil Protection Mechanism [26] regulates the cooperation 
between the EU Member States and 6 Participating States 
in the field of civil protection, with a view to improve pre-
vention, preparedness, and response to disasters. 
2.3 Changes in economy and society nobilities
The changes in economy and society can be characterized 
by the next five most important factors: (i) rapid industri-
alization including the establishment of plants producing 
dangerous products or using dangerous technologies, (ii) 
globalization (including the shift of dangerous production 
to third countries), (iii) design and establishment of large 
systems that considerably change the nature and introduce 
new safety problems (like water reservoirs), (iv) migra-
tion, urbanization causing extra travel and transportation 
demand and concentrating people in large cities and (v) 
increase the importance of security defense.
According to the railroad damage, to characterize 
the new safety and security problems, a semi-empirical 
approach based on GIS (Geographic Information System) 
maps [11, 27, 28] can be used.
2.4 Technology developments 
Technology developments support disaster management 
in three major forms:
• development of a new approach (vision) being adapted 
even to the new factors/trends (like the increasing role 
of sustainability, climate change, or the use of new 
supply change lines, as the new Silk Road' freight 
train from China to Europe),
• new methods, new solutions,
• new technologies. 
Disasters management centers based on new technolo-
gies may provide a rather accurate actual information on the 
occurred events, disasters. However, disaster response man-
agement also require to predict the future processes, as out-
comes of the applied actions and the appeared aftershocks 
or secondary effects. Presently, the available technology 
and the collected "historical" information permit to create 
a new simulation and a short-term prediction model to sup-
port the response management in the critical first 8–15 days. 
This paper introduces a new approach with the novelty 
of synthesizing the engineering and management meth-
ods and implementing a recursive adaptive simulation. 
The developed method utilizes a special Markov model 
that approximates the processes after the main earthquake 
occurrence, being combined with the new aftershock pre-
diction and time-depending simulation of the secondary 
effects as tsunami or floods. The simulation also inte-
grates other special models, as the identification of the 
critical infrastructure, the security checks, and the novel 
aftershock forecast method. The two core elements of the 
paper are (i) the definition of the operation value of the 
critical infrastructure and (ii) the introduction of a novel 
indicator, as the relative unusable truck length.
As shown in the Fig. 2, new technologies are in the 
enhancement of monitoring, operation center and decision 
support systems. 
Here passive monitoring means for example that several 
sensors might be integrated in the critical infrastructure 
(like bridges, tunnels) or video cameras are installed in the 
environment. The information can be collected remotely, 
via internet. Active monitoring can be classified into soft 
and hard methods. Soft methods deal with sensors acti-
vating after the earthquake occurrence, such as sending 
drones [11, 29] to explore and estimate the importance 
Fig. 2 Using new technologies in disaster response management
4|Kinzhikeyev et al.Period. Polytech. Civ. Eng.
of the caused damage. Hard active monitoring uses sen-
sors and small actuators integrated in the infrastructure to 
measure signals (like impact or vibration) and record the 
resulting response. The test might be activated automati-
cally (regularly) and from the distance by command points 
(for example in case of an earthquake). All data measured 
can be collected through the internet and operators can 
evaluate these in operator centers. Situation awareness, 
evaluation and decision making process is supported by 
simulation sub-centers. 
All the new methods require special approaches and the 
establishment of dedicated sub-systems. 
3 Improved methods, models
Improved and new models were developed to support the 
general model and the defined new approach to sustain-
ability related to critical infrastructure. As examples, four 
new approaches/models are shortly introduced here. 
3.1 Identification of critical infrastructure
Numerous articles, reports are dealing with response man-
agement, hazard assessment, preparedness, or sustainability 
of critical infrastructures [30–32]. The authors [11, 33, 34] 
created the background to harmonize the requirements of 
sustainability and disaster management. The developed 
and introduced new approach and methodology of main-
taining the sustainability of a critical infrastructure against 
natural disasters (see text box of Table 1). In short, some 
examples of the aspects in table are the followings: 
• cluster - selection of the cluster of economy or soci-
ety - as transportation system, or energy supply chain,
• limits - predefinition of the limit -like the investment 
or capacity,
• damage - estimation of the possible damages (level, 
process, probability),
• interdependence - definition of the level and cross 
influences - percent of dependences, - as minimum all 
the critical infrastructure require energy support, and 
operated by integrated info-communication systems), 
• consequences - the prediction and classification of the 
consequences.
3.2 New approach to hazard assessment 
Hazards assessment deals with safety and/or security 
aspects. Safety accounts for the unwanted event caused 
by errors, failures radical changes in the environment. 
It could be well defined by 
• the risk that accounts for the occurred emergency 
events (related to the working hours),
• the accepted level of safety (generally being equal to 
a risk occurrence ranging from 10–4 to 10–6 per hour),
• the possible implementation of the reliable system 
from lower reliable elements, and sub-systems used 
in parallel. 
Security is an emergency situation caused by the unlaw-
ful and/or intended (terror) actions. It varies according to 
the form of threats. Security risk levels being accepted 
(by the society) are highly depending on real threats. For 
example, the risks of attacking the critical infrastructure by 
a bomb should be less than 10–6 per hour (about one event 
during 115 years), while the risk of a simple cyber attack 
equals to approximately 20–50 events a year, with serious 
cyber attacks (resulting to death) less than 10–6 per hour.
A new and disruptive method of risk estimation was 















Table 1 Recommended method for the identification of critical 
infrastructure
Cluster
Chemical industry, food, … → transport 
Investment: x → x (107 EUR);  
Capacity: y → y (2 × 104 people)
Sector Flood, epidemics, … →  earthquake
Limits Limits(Average score characterising the sector should be ≥ 5)
Causing 
event
Causing event → earthquake (M – Magnitude) 
(0 for < 6 M, 1 → 6 M, 3 → 7 M, 6 → 8 M, 10 for ≥ 9 M)
Destabilizing 
factor
Factor (tolerance to the impact caused by earthquakes) 
(0 for < 0 M, Sc. = M,  
(if probability of surveillance ≥ 0,75))
Damage Slight – moderate – extensive – complete damage (static, dynamic damage, collapse, survivability – probability)
Interde-
pendence
Level and cross influence of interdependence




Consequences (short, middle and long-term total cost of 
losses determined for different level of causing effect)
Safety and 
Security
Safety and Security  
(Risk evaluation methods and method based on 
comparative analysis score = 6 – (log R-6))
Analyses
Analyses (subjective evaluation of existing and 





(Subjective evaluation of possible improvements) 
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where R is the security risk, RF a security risk factor, indexes 
n, C, define the new system, new structural or operational 
solution and conventional, existing system, while i lists the 
risk factors as assets, vulnerability, outcomes, threat, vio-
lence, success. 
Table 2 demonstrates the application of the improved 
security risk estimation concept on the example threat to train 
bridge in urban region close to city center. The risk estima-
tion is the result of authors' calculation supported by experts.
3.3 Modelling the seismic aftershock appearance
The development of response methodology should have 
models for the possible prediction of aftershock appearances. 
This requires two tasks: (i) the prediction of aftershocks with 
the possible size of the impacted area and (ii) the evaluation 
of the damage extent caused by the earthquakes.
While several models are used for aftershock predic-
tion [9, 10], unfortunately all these have at least two weak- 
nesses:
• cannot provide general approximation due to the large 
uncertainties in their parameters,
• cannot give information on the location of aftershock 
occurrences. 
Theoretical studies concluded that aftershocks occur 
randomly and in elliptic areas (see Fig. 3(a) showing the 
distribution of 243 earthquakes being larger than magni-
tude 5.0 that followed the mainshock (of Mw = 9.2, Alaskan 
(1964) earthquake) during 10 months [35]), 90% of which 
are appeared in drawn ellipsis).
A special model was developed [11, 12] using a Monte 
Carlo Simulation to predict the aftershock occurrences 
and bivariate normal models to define the local sites of the 
aftershock appearance (Fig. 3(b)). This method uses 4 ran-
dom values, 2 for Monte Carlo simulation and 2 for the 
prediction of the location. 
4 General model
Nowadays, the life-cycle and more particularly the total 
life-cycle cost (TLCC) is recommended to use for the 
objective evaluation of large natural-ecological-socio- 
technogenic systems. The operational objectives (design, 
building, operation, maintenance, repairing, recycling) of 
the critical infrastructures are
• serving their primary tasks (e.g., supporting the 
changes in travel modes at large modal split centers),
• with minimum cost, 
• at accepted level of safety. 
By applying the TLCC calculation methodology, the 
following approach can be recommended to evaluate the 
operation value (OV) of the critical infrastructure:
Table 2 Security risk estimation for city railway bridge 
No. Risk  Initial risk Risk
 *10–7 1/h initial risk (*10–7 1/h) asset
vulner-
ability consequences threat violance "succes" *10
–7 1/h
1 in-side attacks 6.5 0.95 0.96 0.84 0.9 1.1 0.96 4.7325
2 bomb (in-side) 4.2 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.78 1.03 0.84 2.1111
3 attack by large vehicles 4.7 0.82 0.88 0.76 0.82 0.97 0.92 1.8862
4 attack by UAVs/drones/UGVs 8.7 1.1 0.98 0.92 0.96 1.14 1.06 10.009
5 armed attack 2.3 1 1.02 1 1.08 0.98 1.12 2.781
6 biological or chemical attack 1.4 0.9 1.05 1.04 0.97 0.84 1.24 1.3902
7 cyber attack 12.6 1.3 1.12 1.1 1.24 1.15 1.36 39.137
 total        62.047
Fig. 3 a) Aftershocks distribution and b) bivariate normal distribution 
approximating the aftershocks (appeared after Alaskan Mw = 9.2 
earthquake)







i i ci= = + ∆ , , (2)
where TLCC is the total life-cycle cost, TLCW is the total 
life-cycle work (that in first order can be defined as unit of 
time), indexes ci, i define the critical infrastructure, (con-
ventional) infrastructure, while ∆ takes into account the 
difference between the conventional infrastructure and 
the critical infrastructure. The differences are caused by 
several aspects, which can be classified in the following 
three major groups:
• stronger safety requirements as the possible accidents, 
emergency situations that may cause significant 
effects on the economy, human life, nature and/or 
cultural values,
• increased security requirements caused by the same 
larger dimensions and influences, and
• extra requirements to survive the disasters as earth- 
quakes.
All the differences lead for example to build stron-
ger constructions, to apply duplications, to develop and 
implement condition monitoring, warning systems, pre-
paredness applying the rules and methods of emergency 
management, to reduce the disaster aftermaths, or to apply 
technologies improving the constructions derived from 
the analysis of the real disasters occurred. 































, , ,= ∀ , (4)
where i = 1, 2, …, n, j = 1, 2, …, m; q = 1, 2, …, r defines 
the series of aspect (forms) of safety, security and disas-
ters; w are the weighting coefficients; ∆OVi,cii, j,q are the dif-
ferences in operational value of conventional and critical 
infrastructure (increases in cost) caused by i, j, q types of 
aspects (improvements in constructions).
4.1 Chosen governing indicator
Several indicators can be used to describe the real dam-
ages of railway systems caused by earthquakes and its 
secondary effects. From the stakeholders' point of view, 
especially from the society and economy point of view, 
the usability of the railways is one of the most important 
indicators. In case of disaster and disaster response, the 
unavailability or unusable might be even more important 
performance of the partially damaged railway systems. 
Practically, a rail line might be destroyed in 2–4 times of 
4–15 m long segments, which – due to the lack or alterna-
tive tracks or deviation options – might even block hun-
dreds of km of track length. 
A new governing indicator was introduced as a relative 
unusable track length, , which can be represented as 
l t
L
L w M r V dut
j
m




, , , , ,α , (5)
where: L is the total usable length of the railway network 
(sum of the length of all the network elements that can be 
operated), j = 1, 2, …, m are numbers of critical objects in 
the railway systems (such as railway station, bridges, tun-
nels) and segments of track between the critical elements, 
Lutj is the unusable track length caused by the damage of 
the "j" object, wj – weighting coefficient depending on the 
structural solutions, lifetime, time since last restoration or 
maintenance/repair, determining the damage of the given 
j-th object, M – the magnitude of the earthquake, rj – the 
distance of the given object from the center of the earth-
quake, αj – the angle between rupture propagation and 
mean axis of the object, Vsj – shear wave velocity that is 
a soil measurable mechanical property, and dj – is a statis-
tical damage coefficient.
This indicator may vary from zero, up to 1 (100 %). All 
the disaster events (e.g., earthquake, aftershock, second-
ary effects as tsunami, floods) are increasing, while the 
applied response (should) are decreasing the value of the 
indicator. The state space of the indicator can be divided n 
sub spaces and thus the indicator can be approximated as 
l t P t lut
i
n





where Pi is the probability, showing that the relative unus-
able track length parameter, lut at time t is in the i-th sub-
space, and lutj = (lutj – lutj–1)/2 for i = 1, 2, … n. 
As known, such models (like Eq. (6)) might be approxi-
mated by a Markov chain (as it described in more detailed 
in [11, 12].
4.2 Developed methodology
A special methodology was introduced and developed, 
which synthetized the engineering and management meth-
ods for response management related to earthquake dam-
aged railway system [11]. This approach recommends 
to use direct (immediately on site) response, in order 
to (i) save lives and goods and (ii) minimize the losses. 
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The methodology is based on the actual priority list of crit-
ical infrastructure elements, following their restoration and 
simulated results of chosen actions (repair of the selected 
critical elements). Simulation is composed of numerous 
simulation cycles, being based on Markov chain approxi-
mation of the model Eq. (6). It is recommended to define 
the priority list and repeat the simulation each 0.1 hours 
with "fresh" or adjusted parameters (transition matrix) and 
revised priority rules. 
The simulation process (Fig. 4) includes the following 
elements:
• Preparedness: long-term, large research on risk 
analysis, planning the monitoring system, establish-
ing the response center, staff recruiting, owning the 
simulation techniques, building the depots of materi-
als, machines required for the restoration. 
• Response initiation: immediately after suddenly 
occurred earthquake, identification of the size of 
damage, definition of the priority rules, initiation of 
the simulation support and first actions.
• First level response: evaluation of the events, iden-
tification of the damages estimation of the major 
indicator (relative unusable truck length), identifica-
tion of the elements, (parameters) of the approxima-
tion model, determining the (predictable) response 
process, definition of the revised priority list of the 
required and recommended actions.
• Second level of response: that is a further and broader 
evaluation being applied once considerably new infor-
mation is received (e.g., from the integrated monitor-
ing system, extra measurements provided by mobile 
measuring centers, remote sensing, or drones), or 
serious aftershocks, secondary effects are expected 
(initiated by simulation results or changes in the pri-
oritization), appeared. This step covers (i) the collec-
tion and summary of new data, (ii) the comparison 
of the previous simulation results with the available 
new records, (iii) the identification of new (like after-
shocks) and secondary (as floods, tsunamis) events 
and (iv) the execution of extensive simulations. 
• Third level of response: regular evaluation of how 
objectives were reached, and how the system returned 
to its standard operational level. It also initiates the 
next step recovery planning, by evaluating of the 
indicators being specially developed for this purpose.
• Long Term Recovery Planning: preparing the future 
long term recovery process including (i) the eval-
uation and the characterization of the "final" dam-
ages of the critical elements (damages the require 
long-term reparation or the construction of new 
elements), (ii) the definition of the objective of the 
long-term recovery process, and (iii) the preliminary 
design of the long-term recovery process including 
the technical and financial aspects.
5 Case study - concept verification
The recommended recovery management (Fig. 4) requires 
preliminary studies, good infrastructure, and technical 
staff (to perform measurements, simulation studies and 
result assessment), in order to make the appropriate deci-
sions. The leaders of this management process must have 
an outstanding theoretical and practical knowledge as well 
as an extensive experience (implied knowledge) to success-
fully and efficiently use the recommended methodology.
The described concept was tested with a simple and pre-
sumed event case, by being applied to a simplified railway 
system similar to Kazakhstan's southern railway network, 
with 1 tunnel and 338 bridges from a total of 1720 railway 
bridges in the state (Fig. 4). This part of Kazakh railway 
system is endangered at the western part by floods, at the 
eastern part by earthquakes [4, 36] from south of Almaty 
by mudflow (glacial lake outburst flood) [37], while from 
north of Almaty by flood and industrial hazards [11].
The required inputs including the records on earth-
quakes and especially on railway damages were collected 
by the first author of this paper, in his PhD thesis [11].  
This study – as a case study – deals with a limited sce-
nario, seeing that some secondary effects like tsunami 
cannot be considered. While, Tsunami propagation might 
be the most predictable event [2, 5] that is extensively 
studied and verified, the case study demonstrates the gen-
eral applicability of the developed simulation model based 
disaster response management.
Fig. 4 Concept of the developed response management system related 
to large technical systems damaged by serious disaster events, such 
as earthquakes [11] (upper figure: changes in major indicators, lower 
figure: simulation methodology)
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Fig. 5 demonstrates the typical simulation results sup-
porting the response management. Here, state space 
(of the probability of staying in the given sub-space) was 
divided into 20 subspaces (with 0.05 range) and the two 
extreme values (zero and one) were also added as sub-
spaces. During the simulation, the chosen time interval 
(as cycle step) was 6 minutes (0.1 h). 
Figs. 5(a) and (b) demonstrate the results, when a con-
stant transition matrix and after event effects were used. 
In this simulation, the time interval (as cycle step) was 
0,1 h. Occurrences of the aftershocks were simulated 
using a Monte Carlo method, described above. The sec-
ondary effects were evaluated by the available statistical 
data and models as well as the records provided by the 
information and observation sub-systems. 
Generally, the first simulation cycle, as first level 
response (Fig. 4.) might be repeated at each time-cycle, 
while the further cycles (second and third level responses) 
should be applied in case of necessity. 
The aftershocks and secondary effects such as flood, 
appear in the Fig. 5(a) and (b) as sudden changes. 
6 Conclusions
This paper introduced a new disaster response methodol-
ogy, which is recommended to be implemented as an active 
adaptive response to earthquake damage at large ecologi-
cal-socio-technogenic systems playing a deterministic role 
in the economy and society. A special indicator was intro-
duced, defining the relative unusable track length of the sys-
tem, as a governing indicator in the response management. 
The recommended concept was tested on a railway system. 
The applicability of the recommended methodology 
depends on the available sources, methods, simulation 
techniques, software, which must be preliminarily tested 
and adapted to the given region (e.g., by using GIS data).  
Instead of a simple, but adapted Markov model, more 
complex models can be developed and applied.
Several special sub-models must be developed and 
applied before the use of the recommended response man-
agement concept. For example, a Monte Carlo simulation 
was used to model the aftershocks; or the improved meth-
ods were studied to estimate the fragility curves [38-40] of 
the possible damages of the given critical infrastructures 
caused by the earthquakes.
The results of the case study (with simulation tech-
niques) demonstrated that the developed methodology can 
support the response management related to earthquake 
damaged railways that can be applied to reduce the required 
time to recover and assist the effective use of the available 
resources. The objective of rapid recovery is to return the 
railroad and the railway system to the operational level. 
Therefore, this part of the recovery can be finished in 2–3 
days. In case of a long-term secondary effect, for exam-
ple, a destroyed river dam, the quick recovery time might 
increase to 6–10 days. The complete recovery of the rail-
road and railway system might require up to 1–3 years. 
The studies show that
• the disasters response management of the large eco-
logical-socio-technogenic systems might be sup-
ported by the introduced simulation model based 
methodology,
• the role of the railway systems in (earthquake) response 
management might be considerably improved,
• the developed methodology may significantly reduce 
the required time to restore the railway system.
Fig. 5 Case study results based on the described methodology and 
sub-models: a, b – simulation with constant transition matrix and after 
event effects: 1. – earthquake caused the effect, 2.- correction after 
measurements (by UAV or other tools), 3.- aftershock, 4.- flood, 5.- 
system indicator updates due to updated information on flood and real 
damage caused, 6.- aftershock 
Kinzhikeyev et al.
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